Blood Diamonds
Jennifer Harvey
EDGE, Fall
Quarter 2002
Monday, 1:15 pm
Section
Jennifer Harvey
EDGE, Fall Quarter 2002
Monday, 1:15pm section
Blood Diamonds
Until 1974, Angola had been a colony under Portuguese jurisdiction since 1576. “The combined forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence succeeded in their struggle in removing the Portuguese colonial government in April, 1974”[1]. A bloody transitional period ensued throughout the next year, where a struggle for control of Angola’s government erupted between these three groups. The FNLA quickly disappeared from the scene, and the main battle for power evolved between the MPLA under Jose dos Santos and UNITA under Dr. Jonas Savimbi.
Santos Savimbi
The struggle for control over the Angolan government progressed into a civil war, which continues today. Early in the conflict as a continuation of the Cold War in Africa, the MPLA received aid from the Soviets and Cuba, while UNITA was funded by South Africa and the United States, whose interests were mainly geared toward removing the Cuban military presence in Angola. However, the end of the Cold War “had a significant effect on the foreign involvement in Angola, and as superpower patronage begins to dry up both sides need new sources of revenue”[2].
The United States and South Africa eventually ceased funding UNITA’s movement, and the rebel group had to find its own way of funding its cause. One of the major factors that politically and economically financed the civil war is the exploitation of Angola’s natural resources, namely its petroleum and diamonds. Director Paulinho Neto of Endiama, Angola’s diamond sector, stated, "If there is no war and free circulation of people and goods, we could easily become the second largest producer in the world"[3], but unfortunately the power slipped into the wrong hands. By 1993, UNITA controlled more than half of Angola's national territory, including the diamond rich areas of Cuango and the Lundas Valley. UNITA uses the profits from selling the rough diamonds to purchase arms and ammunition to conquer the MPLA and gain complete control over Angola. UNITA’s gory conquest for diamonds has coined the term “blood diamonds” and “conflict diamonds,” referring to the diamonds that it has purchased to finance the war.
Not only does this issue involve the politics of the diamond trade and the involvement of outside parties, but it is also a devastatingly serious human rights violation to the civilians of Angola. “There is an average of 52 land mine incidents per month and approximately 1 out of every 356 Angolans is an amputee as a result of these bloody conquests”[4]. It was determined in a United Nations Security Council meeting that “there are clear and major weaknesses in systems for controlling diamond trading, which no single country can address effectively because of the many alternative routes available to illicit diamond traders”[5]. Therefore, in order to combat the civil fighting between UNITA and the MPLA, we must educate ourselves about UNITA’s diamond trade, prohibit the sale of blood diamonds, and achieve a commitment from diamond dealers that their diamonds originate from conflict-free mines.
It is difficult to confidently report on UNITA’s
method for taking over diamond mines, but several investigations have given us
some insight. UNITA launched two
particularly damaging attacks on Curango in 1984 and in Andrada in 1985, which
eliminated the revenue that the government would have collected from these
mines. With these two UNITA victories,
the rebel movement was able to spread their diamond control through to the
Lunda diamond fields. With stolen
machinery, rebels loosely joined together to form what known as ‘garimpeiros’,
ravaging mining towns to dig up the precious stones in a hunt for riches. Although it may have been beneficial for
UNITA officials to attempt to establish some sort of structure behind the
garimpeiro, but during the 1980’s there was not a strict structure for the
diamond conquests. “It was informal
mining operations of this kind that sustained UNITA’s war effort after the
withdrawal of direct support by South Africa and Western countries”.[6]
UNITA focused its energy during the 1990’s on diamond mining. As UNITA gained more and more control over Cuango and the Lundas, they “began a process of incorporating diamond mining as its primary industrial and financial base, necessitating proper expertise and bureaucratic oversight,” according to Deitrich. Savimbi called in foreign experts in diamond mining to join the garimpeiro, who both searched the river sediment for rough diamonds and also trained UNITA miners. These foreigners were protected by the rebel military, and received payment of one-fifth of all alluvial sediment mined. The remaining portion was split evenly between UNITA and other foreign diamond miners. Savimbi was able to control the garimpeiro through threatening to use violence, and thus gained a solid, attentive workforce. Many garimpeiro were satisfied enough with their share of the profits that they continue to do it today, even with no violent threats against them.
Map of Angola
With this strong band of workers, UNITA has been able to overtake the diamond mines of Angola. Neto commented on UNITA’s share of the diamond industry, and speculated that UNITA controls 80% of the land. This rebel group maintains firm control over Cuango, a very lucrative diamond area in Angola, and a UNITA official admitted “we are not moving until we get a good profit-sharing deal.”[7]. This indicates that UNITA has no intention of leaving these richly alluvial areas, including the Cuango Valley, Andulo, Lusamba, and Luanda Norte to name a few.
The method in which UNITA has gained control over the diamond mines is very important in this issue, because it has been anything but peaceful. Brutal invasions are common, leaving many civilians dead. Land mines cover the area, resulting in many painful amputations each day. Civilians in the mining towns have been forced to leave their homes to avoid the terror. A non-governmental organization for peacekeeping efforts, Global Witness, reported that:
“The war has resulted in the death, between 1974 to1999, of at least 650,000 Angolans, with thousands more maimed by landmines. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) since January1988 is reported to be 2,861,062. Economic chaos suffered by the majority of the population has left the country in steep decline as defined by all internationally accepted social indicators.”[8]
Numerous articles have been released throughout this conflict, reporting on the violent consequences of UNITA attacks. O Pensador, a journal published by the Embassy of Angola, described an event that was particularly common regarding UNITA’s violent conquests for diamond mines, with headlines such as “UNITA attacks diamond mine, killing eight, kidnapping ten”. A portion of the article reads:
“In the early morning hours of November 8, some 50-100 UNITA forces raided the Vancouver-based DiamondWorks mining site at Yetwene in the Lucapa District of Lunda Norte province. In the violent attack eight mine employees, including two British nationals, were killed, another 16 were wounded and ten people were kidnapped, including a South African national and two Filipino citizens. DiamondWorks has temporarily closed its operation, but hopes to resume mining in January. The shutdown will cost the company approximately $2 million per month.
According to Endiama, Angola's state diamond mining company, the attack on Yetwene is the fourth mining project destroyed by UNITA forces during recent months. Scattered hit-and-run attacks have forced foreign mining companies to consolidate their personnel in core mining areas. At the end of October, Petra Diamonds of South Africa suspended its operations following a UNITA attack on its site in Lunda Sul province…”[9]
News sources flood the papers and journals with articles such as this one too frequently. We cannot allow for these kinds of human rights violations to occur. How is it acceptable for an organization to forcibly enter a town, lacing it with land mines, shooting anyone in opposition, or seriously injuring civilians? The answer is that is isn’t. In the past few years, peacekeeping organizations have paid more attention to this issue, in attempts to cease the violent acts conducted on civilians, and halt the civil war between the Angolan government and UNITA.
Sanctions have been imposed by the United Nations Security Council since 1993, deeming it illegal to sell or purchase conflict diamonds, and included an arms embargo condemning the sale of weapons to UNITA. In 1994, the MPLA and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol hoping to reach peace between these two groups. It called for: “Re-establishment of the cease-fire; Withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces; Disarming of all civilians; Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (F.A.A.), including demobilization.”[10] This agreement gave the United Nations the responsibility to monitor the cease-fire, with agreement between the government of Angola and UNITA. The Lusaka Protocol essentially called for the civil fighting to end.
However, UNITA never upheld the conditions of the Lusaka Protocol, and continued gathering munitions from the profits accumulated from trading blood diamonds. Since 1994 when the Lusaka Protocol was signed, numerous other efforts for peace have been made. Besides the United Nations Security Council, other peacekeeping groups and NGO’s have turned their attention toward stopping UNITA in its tracks.
Peace efforts have been attempted and are underway, but Deitrich acknowledges that we might be less educated than we seem to be about UNITA’s conquest for diamonds. He writes “The campaign [against blood diamonds], although sensational, has been limited because it has not been accompanied by a greater understanding of the intricacies as well as the broader mechanisms of UNITA diamond sales”. We must attempt to learn as much as we can about UNITA’s diamond sales and action must be taken by organizations and governments that are dedicated to observing and extinguishing the illicit trade.
One of these
peacekeeping organizations is called Global Witness. A message from its
homepage reads: “Global Witness campaigns to achieve real change by challenging
established thinking on seemingly intractable global issues. We work to
highlight the links between the exploitation of natural resources and human
rights abuses, particularly where natural resources such as timber, diamonds
and oil are used to fund conflict.”[11]. As far as blood diamonds are concerned,
Global Witness aims to “have legally binding regulations imposed by governments
on the international diamond industry to ensure that diamonds no longer fund
conflict in Africa”[12]. This organization aims to observe and gather
information regarding the diamond conflict and aid in organizing substantial
movements to reconcile the problem. “Global Witness is in the vanguard of a
coalition calling for reform of the diamond industry. It includes the British
government, the United Nations, leading diamond producing countries in Africa
and even De Beers, the mining giant that controls 60 per cent of the world’s
uncut diamonds.”
With UNITA’s complete disregard for the cease-fire, other measures had to be taken. A peaceful verbal or written resolution could not be reached to stop the fighting, because UNITA would simply break it. So peacekeepers had to tackle this problem at the root. Several movements were put into place hoping to stop the sale of diamonds from UNITA rebel mines. This means that not only the big diamond dealers such as De Beers must involve themselves in this issue, but there must also be a means of certification ensuring the ‘clean’ origins of the diamonds purchased in the diamond market.
In 1998, the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1176, hoping to “prohibit the direct or indirect export of unofficial Angolan diamonds, defined as those not accompanied by a Certificate of Origin (CO) issued by the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). On the 8th July 1998 the European Union formally adopted the UNSC sanctions and they became binding to all 15 member states”[13]. When UNITA’s diamond sales decreased only slightly, Global Witness published A Rough Trade: The Role of Governments in the Angolan Conflict to expose how diamonds fund civil fighting. The release of this article pushed the issue to the forefront for the United Nations, resulting in several more proposed sanctions. However, it was not until May 2000, when the first talks of the Kimberly Process really made an impact in eliminating the sale of blood diamonds.
The Kimberly
Process Certification Scheme is an effort to have a real influence on the
illicit diamond trade. The
Certification Scheme should be established at the Ministerial Meeting on the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds in Interlaken on 5
November 2002. The movement recalls the
previous attempts to establish peace “including the relevant provisions of
Resolutions 1173 (1998), 1295 (2000), 1306 (2000), and 1343 (2001), and [is]
determined to contribute to and support the implementation of the measures
provided for in these resolutions”[14]. It clearly defines what blood diamonds are
and how their trade perpetuates the war in Angola, so that adherents to this
Certification Scheme will understand how they are helping. The Kimberly Process was designed so that
with assistance from “the European
Community, the diamond industry and civil society, a minimum acceptable
international standards for national certification schemes relating to trade in
rough diamonds can be established. It
is hoped that the certification scheme will stem the flow of rough diamonds
from rebel-held conflict areas, in support of the existing UN Security Council
sanctions, thereby contributing substantially to peace efforts.”[15]. It clearly states that trade of diamonds is
allowed and encouraged, as diamonds are one of Angola’s great natural
resources, but that these diamonds should be traded with a certificate of
origin ensuring that they do not come from UNITA rebel mines. In this way, UNITA’s funding is cut off, and
hopefully this rebel group will have to accept peaceful tactics, or learn to
cooperate with the MPLA.
The De Beers company and its Central Selling Organization (CSO) have dominated the international diamond industry for the last 60 years; “sorting, valuing and selling around 80% of the world's diamond production. Company literature boasts that the cartel structure provided by the CSO is of benefit to all involved in the international diamond trade.”[16]. De Beers acknowledges the seriousness of blood diamonds, and limiting their trade. The company has agreed to the propositions of the Kimberly Process, which will officially be implemented January, 2003. De Beers commits themselves to:
Operating our business in such a way that we neither engage in nor encourage in any manner the following practices which are regarded as unacceptable and against public interest:
- buying and trading rough diamonds from areas where this would encourage or support conflict or human suffering,
- the use of child labor,
- and practices which intentionally or recklessly endanger the health or wealth of individuals
It is commitments such as these that give the world hope for a peaceful diamond trade.
At the corporate level, it sometimes gives people in power piece of mind to simply blind themselves to aspects of business, while focusing on others, such as revenue. A CEO of a company might be elated to think about the profits that his company racks in, despite the costs it might be putting on others. Also, a man asking for a woman’s hand in marriage is probably far more concerned with her response than where his diamond came from. If the consumers are in the dark about an issue that involves tremendous human rights violations, then whose job is it to enforce corporate social responsibility? According to G. Pascal Zachary, “Corporate social responsibility is often presented as an extra cost, an added burden borne by a corporation already struggling to be profitable in a difficult economic phase. But in some situations, the opportunity to improve its business ethics also offers a company extraordinary marketing and branding possibilities.”[17]. Diamonds, because of their precious nature, have never really held a trademark with them, and ‘brands’ have never been distinguished as they have been with other products. Many products sell simply because of their brand name, Nike for example. Consumers, unless they are particularly diamond-savvy, rarely know the origins of the diamonds they purchase. However, as the issue of blood-diamonds has become more well known among peacekeeping organizations, they started spreading their message to the diamond industry. A spokesperson for De Beers noted that once the gravity of the issue was clearly brought to the attention of the company, that they could not overlook it anymore. With regards to the Global Witness report, the spokesman, Gilbert, stated: “The report was very well written, and we realized these are serious people and they have a serious message.”[18]. Not only did he realize that by ensuring the “clean” origin of the diamonds that the De Beers company purchases and sells are they helping to cease civil fighting in Angola, but there is even a new way to distinguish De Beers diamonds from others in the diamond market, which could actually benefit the company. Zachary writes, “Out of the mess of blood diamonds, a new branding strategy was born. De Beers now presents its diamonds as conflict-free, thus gaining a potentially powerful edge on rival suppliers in Israel, Russia and Brazil.”18 Other diamond suppliers, such as those from Israel, Russia, and Brazil are known to purchase their diamonds from conflict-areas, and De Beers’s can now both promote their diamonds in a socially responsible light. If De Beers adjusts their marketing strategy to insist that their diamonds come from mines other than the rebel-controlled mines in Angola, they can create a socially conscious marketing scheme that gives them another angle above the competition, benefiting society and their organization.
The
actions taken to stop UNITA from continuing its path of destruction have
followed a logical scheme. NGO’s have
gathered much information about the process by which rebel officials overtake
diamond mines, and have gained an understanding of UNITA’s aims. We now know who the major players are in
this issue, and have established well-planned peace efforts, including the
prohibition of the sale of blood diamonds.
A solid commitment from the leading diamond dealer, De Beers, has been
made to ensure that no diamonds that they sell come from conflict areas. Each diamond shall contain a Certificate of
Origin documenting its source. “Alex Yearsley, a spokesman for Global
Witness, which led the campaign against conflict diamonds said, ‘we are happy
with the agreement. It is great that the governments signed up to it.’ He
added: ‘Hopefully, it will stop a good 80-90% of conflict diamonds.’”[19] And once this is achieved, hopefully there
can be peace in Angola.
Works Cited:
Author: Deitrich, Christian.
Title: “UNITA’s Diamond Mining and Exporting Capacity”
Address: http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/BOOKS/Angola/14Dietrich.pdf
Author: Kimberly Delegates
Title: “Kimberly Process Certification Scheme” November 5, 2002
Address:http://www.diamonds.net/news/newsitem.asp?num=7177&type=all&topic=Conflict
Author: Lewis, Lloyd R, III.
Title: “Trade and Environment Database – case number 32”
Address: http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/ANGOLA.HTM
Author: MacAskill, Ewen.
Title: “Diamond States Bar War Zone Stones” November 6, 2002.
Source: The Guardian
Address: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,834258,00.html
Author: Parker, Andrew, and Sanghera, Sathnam and Gurerreraa, Francesco
Title: “Between a Rock and a Hard Place” July 12, 2000.
Source: Financial Times
Address: http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/display-article.php?id=18
Author: Pearce, Justin
Title: “UNITA Resumes Diamond Mining”
Source: allAfrica.com
Address: http://allafrica.com/stories/200211070346.html
Author: Zachary, G. Pascal
Title: “Conflict-Rree Diamonds: A Competitive Edge?”
Source: Business for Social Responsibility Magazine, Nov 12, 2002.
Address :http://www.bsr.org/BSRResources/Magazine/Columnists.cfm?DocumentID=27923
Title: “Campaign Chronology”
Source: Global Witness
Address: http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/chronology.html
Title: “The Civil
War in Angola”
Address: http://www.soros.org/whats_new/rafael/civilwarqa.html
Title: “Diamonds – Introduction and Campaign Aim”
Source: Global Witness
Address: http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/index.html
Title: “Global Witness”
Source: Global Witness
Address: http://www.globalwitness.org/indexhome.html
Title: “Kimberly Process”
Address: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/default.asp
Title: “MPLA and UNITA Fail to Cut a Deal on Diamonds”
Source: Business Times
Address: http://www.btimes.co.za/97/0622/world/world3.htm
Title: “Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Angola”
Source: United States Institute of Peace Library
Address: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/angola/lusaka_11151994_annex.html#1
Title: “A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict, a Report by Global Witness” December, 1998
Source: Global Witness
Address: http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/downloads/art.txt
Title: “Security Council Press Release 4311th meeting” April 19, 2001
Address: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7049.doc.htm ,
Title: “UNITA Attacks Diamond Mine, Killing Eight, Kidnapping Ten”
Source: O Pensador
Address: http://www.angola.org/news/pensador/december98/yetwene.html